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Summary 
I compare and contrast five climate scenarios: (1) no climate policy; (2) non-cooperative 
cost-benefit analysis (NC CBA); (3) NC CBA with international permit trade; (4) NC 
CBA with joint and several liability for climate change damages; and (5) NC CBA with 
liability proportional to a country’s share in cumulative emissions. As estimates of the 
marginal damage costs are low, standard NC CBA implies only limited emission 
abatement. With international permit trade, emission abatement is even less, as the 
carbon tax is reduced in countries with fast-growing emissions, and because a permit 
market ignores the positive, dynamic externalities of abatement. Proportional liability 
shifts abatement effort towards the richer countries, but away from the fast-growing 
economies; again, long-term, global emission abatement is reduced. Joint and several 
liability would lead to more stringent climate policy. These findings are qualitatively 
robust to the size and accounting of climate change impacts, to the definition of liability, 
and to the baseline scenario 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis of greenhouse gas emission control is one way of deciding on climate 
policy. Cost-benefit analysis has the advantage of being rigorously rooted in welfare theory. If 
benefits and costs are representative and correctly estimated, the course of action advised by a 
cost-benefit analysis would result in the greatest good for the greatest number (Nordhaus, 
1991; Manne et al., 1995; Tol, 1999). 
Practicalities aside (Pearce, 1976; van den Bergh, 2004), there is a fundamental problem with 
cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is based on Pareto superiority. A situation is 
Pareto superior to another situation if no one is worse off and at least someone is better off. 
For practical purposes, Pareto superiority is replaced with potential Pareto superiority, in 
which the winners compensate the losers; and no one is worse off after compensation (cf. 
Farrow, 1998). This is fine if in a national context (if compensation indeed works). It is fine in 
the case of many sovereign actors, with compensation and if the baseline/no policy case is 
agreeable. 
In climate change, neither of these conditions are met. Essentially, the Pareto superiority 
criterion states that the “policy case” must be better for all than the “no policy case”. The no 
policy case is elevated to being the yardstick against which everything is measured. However, 
without policy, one country’s emissions impose impacts on other countries. Using cost-benefit 
analysis to look at improvements over this baseline situation is tantamount to declaring that 
there is a right to emission greenhouse gases. Instead, one may argue that there is a right to a 
stable climate. In this paper, I follow Coase (1960) and investigate the implications for cost-
benefit analysis of greenhouse gas emission abatement of assigning the property rights of the 
atmosphere to the victims of climate change. 
There are a large number of papers on equity and climate change (Azar, 2000; Bosello and 
Roson, 2002; Byrne et al., 1998; Ikeme, 2003; Jamieson, 1996; LeCocq et al., 2000; Müller, 
2001; Ridgley, 1996; Rose et al., 1998; Sagar, 2000; Sugiyama and Deshun, 2004; Tonn, 
2003; Yohe and van Engel, 2004; Yohe et al., 2000; see Arrow et al., 1996, and Banuri et al., 
1996, for reviews of the earlier literature). Many of these papers have difficulty separating the 
inequities of a world with climate change and the inequities of a world without climate 
change. There are many papers on cost-benefit analysis of climate change (Ambrosi et al., 
2003; Azar and Lindgren, 2003; Azar and Sterner, 1996; Gaertner, 2001; Hasselmann et al., 
1997; Maddison, 1995; Nordhaus, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; 
Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Peck and Teisberg, 1992, 1994, 1995; Tol, 1997, 1999a,b), but 
these papers duck the equity issue. There are many papers on alternatives to cost-benefit 
analysis (Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996; Lempert et al., 1996; Petschel-Held et al., 1999; Toth 
et al., 2002), but these papers often ignore equity and typically use hand-waiving rather than 
rigorous arguments. 
The papers that come closest to my analysis are Tol (2001, 2002c), Kemfert and Tol (2002), 
Tol and Verheyen (2004), and Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001). Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) study 
the implications if the ownership of the atmosphere is with future generations rather than with 
the present; they do not look at regional differences, and pay scant attention to the damage 
costs of climate change. Tol and Verheyen (2004) discuss liability for climate impacts in 
some detail, but do not study the effects on climate policy. Tol (2001, 2002c) looks at a range 
of generalisations of and alternatives to utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, but not at a Coasian 
swap of property rights. Kemfert and Tol (2002) do include the polluter-pays-principle, but among a range of alternatives, and really focus on the effects of spillovers of emission 
reduction. 
This paper is on the effect on climate policy of assigning property rights to a stable climate. 
One may interpret this as a Coasian analysis (Coase, 1960). One may interpret this as the 
polluter-pays-principle (e.g., O’Connor, 1997). One may also interpret this as liability for 
climate change impacts (Whitmore, 2000). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model used. Section 3 discusses the 
basic results in detail for four climate policy scenarios, all based on non-cooperative decision 
making. The first scenario is standard; the second adds international trade in emission permits, 
the third scenario includes joint and several liability, and the fourth partial liability. Section 4 
shows sensitivity analysis on key assumptions and parameters. Section 5 discusses and 
concludes. 
 
2. The  model 
This paper uses version 2.8 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.8 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and applied 
by Tol (1999a,b, 2001, 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described by Tol 
(2002a,b) and updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further difference is that the current version 
of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. Finally, the model considers emission 
reduction of methane and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described by Tol 
(forthcoming).
1 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. 
The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America, 
Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island 
States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The prime reason for 
starting in 1950 is to initialise the climate change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of 
climate change are assumed to depend on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting 
the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 
1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical and monetised impacts of climate 
change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs. The 22
nd and 23
rd 
centuries are included to account for the fact that key impacts of a weakening or a shutdown 
of the thermohaline circulation would be disregarded if the time horizon of the simulations 
were shorter. Previous versions of the model stopped at 2200. 
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes & Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2000 is based on 
observations (WRI, 2000). The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on the 
EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et 
al., 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past, and the period 
2100-2300 extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous 
energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonisation of the energy use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land 
use change, methane and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and population growth are 
                                                 
1 A full list of papers and the source code of the model can be found at http://www.uni-
hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/fund.html. perturbed by the impact of climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate 
change related deaths that result from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical 
cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-
reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of 
births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among 
the total population is based on the World Resources Databases (WRI, 2000). It is 
extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita income, 
which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration 
between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are 
assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and investment are 
reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces long-term 
economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term. Economic 
growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the 
economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. 
This process is accelerated by abatement policies. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide 
emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the 
economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken 
up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box 
model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. 
(1992). The model also contains sulphur emissions (Tol, forthcoming) 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a 
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life 
of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a 
doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the 
global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change 
pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 
years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess 
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002a,b) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and 
heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water 
resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related damages can be attributed to 
either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 
1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. 
Tol, 2002b). 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they can 
migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are 
monetised. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income. 
The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the 
literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita income 
(Tol, 1995, 1996), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host 
region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled 
explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be 
proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square 
kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is 
assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-
benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, are 
directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in 
their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol, 2002a). Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, 
agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a 
climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and 
the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual 
climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are 
larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the optimum climate. The 
optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag 
behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being 
fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water 
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power 
functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign (cf. Tol, 
2002b). 
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water 
resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and 
ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to 
become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved 
health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
Carbon dioxide emissions are calculated on the basis of the Kaya identity. Abatement policy 
reduces emissions permanently (by changing the trajectories of carbon and energy intensities) 
as well as transiently (reducing current energy consumptions and carbon emissions). One may 
interpret the difference between permanent and transient emission reduction as affecting 
commercial technologies and capital stocks, respectively. The behaviour of the emission 
reduction module is similar to that of the models of Grubb et al. (1995), Ha-Duong et al. 
(1997) and Hasselmann et al. (1997). It is a reduced form way of modelling that part of the 
emission reduction fades away after the policy intervention is reversed, but that another part 
remains through technological lock-in. 
The costs of emission reduction fall, through learning by doing, with cumulative emission 
reduction (Goulder and Mathai, 2000). Emission reduction is assumed to be relatively 
expensive for the region that has the lowest emission intensity. The calibration is such that a 
10% emission reduction cut in 2003 would cost 1.57% (1.38%) of GDP of the least (most) 
carbon-intensive region, and an 80% (85%) emission reduction would completely ruin its 
economy. Emission reduction is relatively cheap for regions with high emission intensities. 
The thought is that emission reduction is cheap in countries that use a lot of energy and rely 
heavily on fossil fuels, while other countries use less energy and less fossil fuels and are 
therefore closer to the technological frontier of emission abatement. The model has been 
calibrated to the results reported in Hourcade et al. (1996); for relatively small emission 
reduction, the costs in FUND correspond closely to those reported by other top-down models, 
but for higher emission reduction, FUND finds higher costs, because FUND does not include backstop technologies, that is, a carbon-free energy supply that is available in unlimited 
quantities at fixed average costs. Tol (2005b) describes the details of the model. 
The costs of methane and nitrous oxide emission reduction are based on the analysis of the 
USEPA (2003). They report supply curves of emission reduction, stating how much can be 
abated at a certain price. First, these supply curves were shifted to exclude negative costs. 
Note that this increases costs. Second, emission reductions were expressed as fractions of 
baseline emissions. Third, total emission reduction costs (the area under the supply curve) was 
calculated, and expressed as a fraction of GDP. Fourth, the regional results of the EPA 
analysis were attributed to the FUND regions. Fifth, the bottom-up curve was approximated 
with a quadratic curve. 
Marginal damage costs are computed by running two scenarios, one with slightly higher 
emissions in the decade of interest; the net present value of the difference in impacts, 
normalised by the additional emissions is used to approximate the marginal damage costs. 
In the policy scenarios below, the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emission reduction are set 
equal to the marginal damage costs. The marginal costs of methane and nitrous oxide 
emission reduction are equal to the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emission reduction times 
the global warming potential. 
 
3. Results 
I compare and contrast five scenarios. The first scenario is the business as usual, or no 
emission control scenario. In the second scenario, the regional marginal costs of emission 
reduction are equal to the regional marginal damage costs of climate change. This 
corresponds to the non-cooperative, Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In this scenario, regions are 
indifferent to their impact on other regions. This may be politically realistic. However, 
marginal abatement costs differ across regions, so there is no permit trade either. 
In the third scenario, I implement Bradford’s (2004) proposal for the design of the 
international climate policy regime. There are no negotiations on emission control, let alone 
obligations. Instead, countries contribute voluntarily to an international climate fund, which 
uses the collected money to buy emission reduction where that is cheapest. This design 
respects sovereignty, and it guarantees cost-effective emission reduction.
2 The fund is the 
intermediary necessary in non-cooperative games with permit trade (cf. Rehdanz and Tol, 
2005); in a non-cooperative game, each country has a different marginal damage costs; with 
emission trade, marginal abatement costs are equal; with the fund in between, countries may 
care differently at the margin about climate change, but have equal marginal abatement costs 
nonetheless. I assume that each country contributes to the fund an amount of money that is 
equal to its marginal damage cost times its annual emissions. If emission reduction costs are 
approximately linear,
3 then, the global marginal abatement costs equal the weighted average 
of the regional marginal damage costs of the regions, where the weights are the regional 
shares in global emissions. 
In the fourth scenario (joint and several liability), I introduce liability for climate change 
impacts. Countries are held liable for all damages they do to other countries. This implies that 
the regional marginal damage costs – or rather damage plus liability – equals the global 
marginal damage costs. This solution equals the cooperative equilibrium, in which countries 
collaborate to maximise the sum of their welfare. This implies, however, that all countries are 
                                                 
2 Provided that the fund operates without excessive transaction costs; note that cost-effectiveness only holds at 
each point in time, but not intertemporally. 
3 In a sufficiently small neighbourhood of the solution, cost curves are linear. liable for all damages. Therefore, in the fifth scenario (proportional liability), countries are 
liable only to the extent that they contributed to climate change. Contributions are measured 
as the share in cumulative emissions since 1990. The regional marginal abatement costs equal 
this share times the global marginal damage costs. 
Obviously, greenhouse gas emissions and marginal damage costs depend on climate policy. 
The model is iterated until the marginal damage costs equal marginal abatement costs. 
Convergence is rapid. Note that, through learning by doing and international technology 
spillover, emission reduction costs also depend on climate policy; as this happens with a delay 
only, the model solves this without additional iterations. 
Table 1 shows the results for the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. In the standard 
non-cooperative scenario, emission reduction is small: The 2100 concentration of carbon 
dioxide is only 13 ppm lower than in the business as usual scenario. Table 2 shows why: The 
regional marginal damage costs are small. The global marginal damages are only $13/tC in 
2005; regional marginal damages are only a fraction of that. In 2055, marginal damages are a 
bit lower; this is because the rate of climate change is slower, and because societies are 
overall less vulnerable to climate change because of economic growth. 
With emission trade, emission reduction is even smaller. This may be surprising: Willingness 
to pay for greenhouse gas emission reduction has not changed, but emission reduction is 
cheaper; the same sum of money should go a longer way. This reasoning is not correct. 
Emission trade redistributes emission reduction effort – see Table 3. Marginal abatement 
costs increase in some regions, but decrease in others – see Table 2; the latter regions buy 
emission permits from the former. In 2005, the three importers of permits are the EU, the 
USA and China. Although climate change impacts are large in developing countries relative 
to their GDP, in absolute dollar terms, impacts are larger in the EU and the USA. China’s 
economy is projected to continue to grow rapidly; and its large share in emissions and 
population imply that there is a substantial internal share of the climate change damages it 
causes. 
Another reason is that the contributions to the international fund are determined by emissions 
and marginal damage costs – and not by the costs of emission reduction. 
Finally, emission trade as implemented here ignores the dynamic externalities of emission 
reduction. There is cost-reducing learning-by-doing in the model, but long-term structural 
changes in the energy sector are more important. In the short-term, permit trade implies 
higher emissions in China and lower emissions in, say, South America. The two cancel. This 
implies a higher emission intensity in China and a lower one in South America, not only in 
the short-term, but also in the long-term. As China’s economy grows faster, global long-term 
emissions are higher if abatement is shifted to South America. 
In the joint and several liability scenario, the 2100 concentration of CO2 is some 70 ppm 
below the baseline – see Table 1. This emission reduction is not substantial – not surprising 
given the low carbon tax – but much higher than in the standard non-cooperative case. Table 2 
shows the marginal damages. 
In the proportional liability scenario, the 2100 concentration of CO2 is again a little higher 
than in the standard non-cooperative scenario. Again, this may surprise. Liability would fully 
internalise the damage done. However, this scenario has proportional liability only, according 
to the shares given in Table 3. That means that a country is liable for only a share of the 
damage done. Furthermore, there is mutual liability, so that a large share of one’s own 
damages can be claimed from other countries. So, proportional liability redistributes the 
emission abatement effort, just like permit trade does. Again, the regions with the highest marginal damage costs – China, the EU and the USA – do less while others regions do more – 
see Table 2. The result is reduced global effort in the long-term – see Table 1.
4 
 
4. Sensitivity  analysis 
The limited emission abatement above is driven by the low marginal damage cost estimates. 
In a first sensitivity analysis, I increase the climate sensitivity – the equilibrium warming due 
to a doubling of atmospheric CO2 – from 2.5°C to 4.5°C. Table 1 shows the results; Table 4 
has the marginal damage costs. Non-cooperative emission reduction is more stringent; the 
2100 CO2 concentration is 100 ppm below the previous baseline, but some 30 ppm of this is 
due to the fact that the increased damages reduce baseline emissions. With joint and several 
liability, the concentration is 315 ppm lower; concentrations never exceed 730 ppm. With 
permit trade and with proportional liability, CO2 concentrations are close to, but slightly 
higher than those in the standard non-cooperative case. A higher climate sensitivity makes the 
pattern I found above more pronounced, but does not qualitatively change it. 
In matters of liability, attention is often focused on the negative impacts. The positive impacts 
of the culpable act are ignored. Similarly, the negatively affected are more inclined to lobby 
politicians than those who are positively affected. In a second sensitivity analysis, I ignore all 
positive impacts of climate change and restrict the attention to the negative impacts. Table 1 
shows the results; Table 4 has the marginal damage costs. Marginal damage costs obviously 
increase, and CO2 concentrations fall. Ignoring positive impacts does not increase the 
marginal damage costs by as much as does increasing the climate sensitivity. The relative 
position of the four abatement scenarios does not change. 
Above, proportional liability is determined by a region’s share in cumulative emissions since 
1990, roughly the year that climate policy started. There are, however, many possible starting 
points (see Tol and Verheyen, 2004, for an extensive discussion). As a sensitivity analysis, I 
take an extreme case, the “Brazilian proposal”, which counts all fossil-fuel emissions since 
the start of the industrial revolution. Table 1 shows the results; Table 3 has the regional shares 
in cumulative emissions. Liability is redistributed towards the OECD; emission abatement is 
more stringent there – compare Tables 2 and 4. However, emission abatement falls in the rest 
of the world, including in China and India, and global emission abatement is reduced as a 
result. 
Energy use is essential for life. One may argue that one cannot be liable for emissions that 
result from covering basic needs. Therefore, as a fourth sensitivity analysis, regions are 
proportionally liable for their share in excess emissions only. Arbitrarily, I define excess 
emissions as emissions above one metric tonne per person per year; this is roughly the global 
average per capita emission today. Table 1 shows the results; Table 2 has the regional share in 
cumulative emissions. Again, liability and abatement are redistributed towards the OECD – 
compare Tables 2 and 4 – and global abatement falls – see Table 1. 
All the liability scenarios above are based on the compensation principle. That is, damages are 
valued as the victim would value them. See Schelling (1984) for a brilliant defence. However, 
one may also value impacts as the polluter would value them. That is, rather than using the 
monetary equivalent of the utility loss of the victim, I impose this utility loss on the polluter 
and use the monetary equivalent of that. If the utility function is logarithmic, this can be 
                                                 
4 In the short-term, abatement also falls. This is because some regions have negative marginal damage costs; in 
the non-cooperative scenario, these countries do not subsidise greenhouse gas emissions, but in the proportional 
liability scenario, their welfare gains are subtracted from the global welfare loss. In the long-term, this effect is 
negligible. approximated by multiplying the regional marginal damage cost with the ratio of the per 
capita income of in the liable region and the victimised region (Fankhauser et al., 1997). 
I show two variants of this. In the first, regions are proportionally liable based on their share 
in cumulative emissions. Table 1 has the results; Table 5 has the marginal damage costs. 
Emission abatement goes up and CO2 concentrations fall, but only to a limited extent, as 
abatement only increases in the OECD – see Tables 1 and 5. In the second variant, regions are 
jointly and severally liable. Concentrations fall considerably, as emission abatement is more 
stringent in most regions, and in all regions with substantial greenhouse gas emissions in the 
business as usual scenario – see Tables 1 and 5. 
As a final set of sensitivity analyses, I vary the baseline emissions. Above, the business as 
usual scenario is the FUND scenario, which is somewhere in between the IS92a and IS92f 
scenarios (Leggett et al., 1992). Table 1 has the results for four SRES scenarios, Table 5 the 
marginal damage costs for A2 and B1, the two extremes. The FUND scenario has higher 
emissions than any of the SRES scenarios. Yet, the A2 scenario has higher marginal damages 
– compare Tables 2 and 5. This is because the economies of developing countries are assumed 
to grow slower in this scenario; these countries are therefore more vulnerable to climate 
change. In the A2 scenario, emission abatement is relatively more stringent than in the FUND 
scenario. Table 1 shows this for the Nash equilibrium, but this would carry over to the other 
policy scenarios. 
In the B1 scenario, global marginal damages are negative in 2005; the positive impacts 
dominate when discounted. However, marginal damages are positive in 2055, but small – see 
Table 5. In the B1 scenario, emission abatement is minimal. This is shown for the Nash 
equilibrium in Table 1, but the result would carry over to the other policy scenarios. 
 
5. Discussion  and  conclusion 
I present a no policy scenario and four alternative climate policy scenarios. In the second 
scenario, countries equate their marginal damage costs and marginal abatement costs. 
Emission reduction is limited. This is in line with the literature (Nordhaus, 1991). The main 
reason is that the estimates of the marginal damage costs are so low (Tol, 2005a). 
In the third scenario, I allow for international trade in emission permits. Contrary to 
expectations, emission abatement falls because the market ignores the dynamic impacts of 
emission reduction and shifts abatement to where it is cheapest. This conclusion is not model-
specific. However, permit trade averages marginal costs. This result holds as long as 
countries with fast-growing emissions have above-average marginal damage costs. 
In the fifth scenario, countries are liable for the share of the marginal damages that they 
caused. This increases abatement effort in the OECD, but reduces effort in the rest of the 
world, with their fast-growing emissions. As a result, long-term emission control is weakened. 
Again, this result is not limited to the model used here. If, however, emission abatement 
would be limited to the OECD, then proportional liability would increase emission control. 
In the fourth scenario, countries are jointly and severally liable. Emission abatement increases 
everywhere, in the short-term as well as in the long-term. As this coincides with full 
cooperation, this result is anticipated (e.g., Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). 
I present five sensitivity analyses, some with variants. Although the numbers are different, the 
insights of the four policy scenarios are not affected. Qualitatively, my results are robust – at 
least as far as I saw. This paper confirms Coase (1960), but not literally. In Coase (1960), there is a polluter and a 
victim. A bargain between the two would result in the same total welfare and pollution 
regardless of whether there is a right to pollute or a right not to be polluted; the distribution of 
welfare would be different. That is, equity is separated from efficiency and efficacy. In this 
paper, all players are polluters and victims at the same time, but to a different degree. This 
makes the analysis more fuzzy, but it does not change the fundamental insight of Coase 
(1960). The initial allocation of property rights matters for issues of equity; proportional 
liability leads to a different distribution of emission abatement efforts and costs. Because I 
ignore dynamic externalities, a redistribution of property rights affects efficiency and efficacy 
as well – but to a limited extent only. Again following Coase (1960), trade in emission 
permits would not increase emission abatement. 
In political terms, attempts to establish liability for greenhouse gas emissions would have 
reduce emissions in rich countries, but, if drawn to its logical conclusion, would increase 
emissions in poor countries and way well increase global emissions. Only if joint and several 
liability is established would global emissions go down. Joint and several liability, however, 
would imply that the victims of climate change are compensated many times over; this is 
unlikely. It appears that establishing liability for greenhouse gas emissions is not the solution 
to the climate problem. 
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Washington, D.C. Table 1. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (in ppm) and the global mean 
temperature (in °C above pre-industrial) in 2100 according to business as usual scenario and 
four policy scenarios; sensitivity analyses are also shown. 
  Base case  High climate sensitivity Negative impacts only
 CO2 Temp CO2 Temp CO2 Temp 
Business as usual (BaU)  942.8  3.70 913.4 6.58 942.8  3.70
Nash equilibrium (NE)  929.3  3.67 842.2 6.29 887.9  3.59
NE, permit trade (PT)  929.4  3.67 845.1 6.30 888.2  3.59
Joint and several liability 
(JSL) 872.9  3.55 628.0 5.31 810.5  3.41
Proportional liability (PL)  930.6  3.67 851.9 6.33 888.0  3.59
PL,  Brazilian  proposal  932.4  3.67    
PL,  excess  emissions  929.9  3.67    
PL,  polluter’s  values  922.6  3.65    
JSL,  polluter’s  values  830.6  3.44    
BaU,  SRES  A1B  809.2  3.73    
NE,  A1B  807.8  3.71    
BaU,  A2  811.9  3.49    
NE,  A2  798.2  3.45    
BaU,  B1  576.7  3.10    
NE,  B1  576.3  3.10    
BaU,  B2  749.4  3.41    
NE,  B2  741.6  3.38    
 Table 2. Regional marginal damage costs (in $/tC) in 2005 and 2055 in four alternative policy 
scenarios. 
  2005      2055   
 NE  PT  JSL  PL  NE PT  JSL  PL 
USA  2.20 2.08  13.27 2.61 1.15 2.10 11.40 1.80
CAN  0.09 2.08  13.27 0.20 0.08 2.10 11.40 0.14
WEU  3.16 2.08  13.27 1.29 2.08 2.10 11.40 0.84
JPK  -1.42 2.08  13.27 0.86 0.21 2.10 11.40 0.63
ANZ  -0.05 2.08  13.27 0.13 0.08 2.10 11.40 0.09
EEU  0.10 2.08  13.27 0.31 0.09 2.10 11.40 0.27
FSU  1.27 2.08  13.27 1.45 0.61 2.10 11.40 1.36
MDE  0.05 2.08  13.27 0.66 0.33 2.10 11.40 0.65
CAM  0.07 2.08  13.27 0.18 0.12 2.10 11.40 0.15
SAM  0.27 2.08  13.27 0.36 0.15 2.10 11.40 0.30
SAS  0.36 2.08  13.27 0.86 0.34 2.10 11.40 0.84
SEA  0.73 2.08  13.27 0.52 0.45 2.10 11.40 0.54
CHI  4.36 2.08  13.27 3.39 4.88 2.10 11.40 3.40
NAF  0.97 2.08  13.27 0.16 0.42 2.10 11.40 0.13
SSA  1.07 2.08  13.27 0.24 0.33 2.10 11.40 0.19
SIS  0.06 2.08  13.27 0.06 0.07 2.10 11.40 0.06
World  13.27  2.08 13.27 13.27 11.40 2.10 11.40 11.40
 Table 3. Regional shares in 2005 and 2055 in current carbon dioxide emissions for the permit 
trade (PT) scenario and in cumulative emissions for three alternative proportional liability 
scenarios (PL: cumulative emissions since 1990; BP: cumulative emissions since 1850; EE: 
cumulative emissions in excess of 1 tC/p/yr since 1990). 
  2005      2055   
  PT PL BP EE PT PL BP EE 
USA  0.192 0.197 0.266 0.350 0.130 0.158 0.188 0.241
CAN  0.015 0.015 0.021 0.024 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.017
WEU  0.085 0.097 0.201 0.104 0.060 0.074 0.111 0.077
JPK  0.062 0.065 0.050 0.093 0.046 0.055 0.052 0.070
ANZ  0.009 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.011
EEU  0.020 0.023 0.039 0.016 0.025 0.024 0.029 0.025
FSU  0.107 0.109 0.123 0.156 0.124 0.119 0.121 0.172
MDE  0.053 0.050 0.029 0.045 0.060 0.057 0.050 0.054
CAM  0.014 0.013 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.003
SAM  0.027 0.027 0.023 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.000
SAS  0.073 0.065 0.035 0.000 0.076 0.074 0.063 0.000
SEA  0.046 0.039 0.021 0.000 0.049 0.047 0.040 0.003
CHI  0.263 0.256 0.148 0.198 0.340 0.298 0.253 0.325
NAF  0.012 0.012 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.000
SSA  0.017 0.018 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.000
SIS  0.005 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001
 Table 4. Regional marginal damage costs (in $/tC) in 2005 and 2055 in four alternative policy 
scenarios and two sensitivity analyses: high climate sensitivity (CS) and negative impacts 
only (NO). 
  2005       2055    
  CS, NE  CS, PL  NO, NE  NO, PL  CS, NE CS, PL NO, NE  NO, PL 
USA 7.01  19.86  3.43  5.45 3.55 10.09 1.38 2.05 
CAN 0.47  1.52  0.22  0.42 0.31 0.77 0.08 0.16 
WEU 14.99  9.81  5.94 3.07 8.28 4.69 2.54 0.95 
JPK 4.14  6.56  0.89  1.85 3.86 3.51 0.54 0.71 
ANZ 0.57  0.96  0.07  0.26 0.54 0.53 0.06 0.11 
EEU 0.72  2.34  0.24  0.77 0.44 1.50 0.10 0.31 
FSU 4.78  11.02  1.71  3.46 2.50 7.48 0.63 1.55 
MDE 2.69  5.04  0.61  1.23 2.03 3.67 0.39 0.74 
CAM 1.16  1.34  0.24  0.35 0.75 0.86 0.14 0.18 
SAM 1.48  2.71  0.65  0.71 0.67 1.68 0.22 0.34 
SAS 2.95  6.53  0.67  1.55 1.85 4.68 0.36 0.95 
SEA 4.04  3.98  1.34  0.89 2.13 3.00 0.56 0.61 
CHI 49.35  25.84  9.31  6.60 33.42 18.85 5.11 3.87 
NAF 3.11  1.19  1.03  0.31 1.51 0.73 0.43 0.15 
SSA 2.90  1.82  1.14  0.53 1.11 1.06 0.33 0.22 










a Weighted average marginal damage costs, where the weights are the regional shares in 
current emissions. This value is used in the permit trade (PT) scenario. 
b Sum of the regional marginal damage costs. This value is used in the joint and several 
liability (JSL) scenario. Table 5. Regional marginal damage costs (in $/tC) in 2005 and 2055 for four sensitivity 
analyses: polluter’s values (PV) with joint and several liability (JSL) and proportional liability 
(PL), and alternative baseline scenarios (A2 and B1). 
  2005       2055    
  JSL, PV PL, PV  A2  B1  JSL, PVPL, PV A2  B1 
USA 232.95  45.83  2.57  1.37 86.76 13.71 1.46 0.74
CAN 164.01  2.47  0.10  0.01 60.07 0.72 0.10 0.03
WEU 201.64  19.60  3.77  0.65 75.73 5.57 2.57 0.50
JPK 304.43  19.79  -1.29  -1.96 114.73 6.30 0.26 -0.32
ANZ 132.76  1.25  -0.03  -0.10 50.96 0.42 0.10 0.03
EEU 20.60  0.48  0.17  0.01 15.08 0.36 0.15 0.04
FSU 14.30  1.56  1.87  0.79 10.33 1.23 0.98 0.31
MDE 15.28  0.76  0.09  -0.26 8.86 0.51 0.35 0.03
CAM 17.82  0.24  0.30  -0.08 10.34 0.14 0.30 0.03
SAM 22.91  0.62  0.49  0.01 13.09 0.35 0.26 0.02
SAS 3.99  0.26  0.34  -0.18 2.38 0.18 0.36 0.01
SEA 14.16  0.56  0.58  -0.14 8.57 0.41 0.40 0.00
CHI 19.10  4.88  8.03  -1.98 14.99 4.47 8.25 0.57
NAF 8.92  0.11  0.94  0.30 4.98 0.06 0.45 0.07
SSA 2.81  0.05  1.17  0.38 1.60 0.03 0.40 0.06
SIS 7.42  0.03  0.17  0.01 4.44 0.02 0.17 0.03
World
a  1183.11 98.49  19.26  -1.18 482.93 34.48 16.56 2.14
a Sum of the regional marginal damage costs. This value is used in the joint and several 
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